Marquette Law Review
Volume 103
Issue 1 Fall 2019

Article 8

2019

Turning Wisconn Valley into the Next Silicon Valley: Reforming
Wisconsin Non-Compete Law to Attract High-Tech Employers
Kelly Krause

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Contracts Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Legislation Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Repository Citation
Kelly Krause, Turning Wisconn Valley into the Next Silicon Valley: Reforming Wisconsin Non-Compete Law
to Attract High-Tech Employers, 103 Marq. L. Rev. 237 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol103/iss1/8

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

KRAUSE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE)

12/3/2019 7:52 PM

TURNING WISCONN VALLEY INTO THE
NEXT SILICON VALLEY: REFORMING
WISCONSIN NON-COMPETE LAW TO
ATTRACT HIGH-TECH EMPLOYERS
The July 2017 arrival of Taiwanese tech-giant Foxconn and the
establishment of the Wisconn Valley Science and Technology Park in Wisconsin
reflects a larger trend in the United States to reinvent the nation’s
manufacturing economy with high-tech production. High-tech employers have
substantial interests in retaining employees in order to protect their valuable
proprietary information and market share. Non-compete agreements, also
known as restrictive covenants or covenants not to compete, are often the legal
device used to secure these interests. This Comment argues that to attract and
retain employers in the tech industry, Wisconsin should reform its non-compete
law by adopting new statutory language and exercising judicial restraint that
reconciles conflicts of interest between employers, employees, and the public.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“[T]he single largest economic development project in the history of
Wisconsin.”1 A “game changer.”2 “[A] home run for Wisconsin.”3
“[S]omething so special.”4 These are a small sampling of the reactions to
Taiwan-based Foxconn’s July 2017 announcement that the tech-giant would
invest ten billion dollars in Wisconsin by constructing an ultramodern LCD
manufacturing plant and establishing its North American headquarters in the
state.5 The move also inspired the creation of the Wisconn Valley Science and
Technology Park.6
The plan, and its reception, reflects a larger trend in the United States to
reinvent the nation’s manufacturing economy with high-tech production.
While the U.S. maintains the world’s strongest research and development
culture, it has failed to focus on the production of the high-value technologies
it creates.7 This “innovate here, produce there” 8 model has resulted in serious
1. Patrick Marley & Jason Stein, Foxconn Announces $10 Billion Investment in Wisconsin and
J.
SENTINEL
(July
26,
2017),
up
to
13,000
Jobs,
MILWAUKEE
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/2017/07/26/scott-walker-heads-d-c-trump-prepares-wisconsinfoxconn-announcement/512077001/ [https://perma.cc/SZ3S-G4HB]. This quote was given by
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker on July 26, 2017. Id.
2. Id. This quote was given by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan on July 26, 2017. Id.
3. Id. This quote was given by White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus on July 26, 2017. Id.
4. Donald Trump, President, U.S., Remarks at Foxconn Facility (June 28, 2018). This quote was
given by President of the United States Donald Trump on June 28, 2018. Id.
5. Lulu Chang, Foxconn is Coming to America — More Specifically, to its New Milwaukee HQ,
DIG. TRENDS (June 17, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/foxconn-milwaukee/
[https://perma.cc/P3DM-YZT4].
6. See Michael Burke, Wisconn Valley, Early Stages, Taking Shape, J. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://journaltimes.com/business/local/wisconn-valley-early-stages-taking-shape/article_e14843602af6-5cdf-94b2-93b6f138b222.html [https://perma.cc/2LYF-DJTC]. “The Wisconn Valley Science
and Technology Park will . . . serve as a science and technology park to promote research and
development in advanced technologies in areas such as cloud computing, mobile devices, Internet of
Things, Big Data, artificial intelligence (AI), networks, and robotics and automation . . . . In addition,
it will serve as an industry internet platform to enable hundreds of thousands of small and medium size
manufacturers to be part of the advanced manufacturing in the Midwest and in America.” Press
Release, Foxconn, Foxconn and U.S. Leaders Celebrate Groundbreaking of Wisconn Valley Science
and Technology Park (June 28, 2018) (on file with Urban Milwaukee). The hub has also inspired the
Wisconn Valley Venture Fund, which will invest in high-tech startups and manufacturing. Rick
Romell & Sarah Hauer, Foxconn, Advocate Aurora Health, Johnson Controls and Northwestern
Mutual Create $100 Million Venture Fund, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/2018/08/28/foxconn-advocate-aurora-healthjohnson-controls-and-northwestern-mutual-create-100-million-venture-f/1124290002/
[https://perma.cc/TU55-YXT3].
7. William B. Bonvillian, Donald Trump’s Voters and the Decline of American Manufacturing,
ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Summer 2016 at 27, 34.
8. Id. at 37. A primary example of this model is Apple Inc. Id. Apple leads the world with
dramatic technological innovations but sends virtually all its production to Asia. Id.
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consequences.9 From 2000 to 2010, manufacturing employment in the U.S. fell
from seventeen million to under twelve million, a decline of almost one-third.10
Moreover, the employment trends of this decade were accompanied by drastic
declines in manufacturing investment, output, and productivity.11 In contrast,
countries like Germany, Japan, Taiwan, and China use their experiences in
manufacturing to inform their research and development, closing gaps in their
innovation processes.12
To address the U.S.’s manufacturing shortfalls, thereby strengthening the
economy and generating technological innovations, advanced manufacturing
jobs are needed.13 Advanced manufacturing jobs are highly skilled, involving
both the production of advanced technologies and innovative ways to
manufacture existing products.14 One Foxconn official estimates two-thirds of
the promised 13,000 new jobs will be highly skilled positions.15 Wisconsin,
luckily, has anticipated this necessity and already begun training a capable
workforce. Publicly, Wisconsin has invested hundreds-of-millions of dollars
in workforce development through programs such as Wisconsin Fast Forward
(WFF).16 The WFF alone allocates 500,000 dollars of grants annually for
technical education in advanced manufacturing fields.17 Privately, companies
9. Id.
10. Id. at 31.
11. Id.
12. WILLIAM B. BONVILLIAN & PETER L. SINGER, ADVANCED MANUFACTURING: THE NEW
AMERICAN INNOVATION POLICIES 8 (2017).
13. SUBCOMM. FOR ADVANCED MFG., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, ADVANCED
MANUFACTURING: A SNAPSHOT OF PRIORITY TECHNOLOGY AREAS ACROSS THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT iii (2016).
14. Id. at 2 n.1.
15. Rick Romell, Foxconn Will Need Thousands of Workers with Entry-Level Skills and a High
J.
SENTINEL
(May
4,
2018),
School
Diploma,
MILWAUKEE
https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/2018/05/04/foxconn-need-thousands-workers-entrylevel-skills/578022002/ [https://perma.cc/6H7B-WHWF].
These positions include, software
engineers, data scientists, IT specialists, technical writers, and high-performance computing
developers.
Specialized
Hiring,
FOXCONN,
https://recruiting.adp.com/srccar/public/RTI.home?c=2175907&d=ExternalCareerSite
[https://perma.cc/J9F4-BLUF] (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
16. OFFICE OF SKILLS DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF WIS. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., Expanded
Wisconsin Fast Forward Program: Advanced Manufacturing Technical Education Equipment Grants:
Grant
Program
Guidelines,
1
(Mar.
1,
2018),
http://www.wisconsinfastforward.com/pdf/18_19_adv_mfg_tech_edu_equip_grant_program_guideli
nes.pdf [https://perma.cc/VH87-YP5M].
17. Id. Grants from 5,000 to 50,000 dollars are awarded to Wisconsin schools “for the
acquisition of equipment used in advanced manufacturing fields in the workplace, together with any
software necessary for the operation of the equipment and any instructional material necessary to train
pupils in the operation of the equipment.” Id. The grant program’s guidelines admit to Wisconsin’s
skilled worker shortage and need to prepare students for success in a “modern, global, and competitive
economy.” Id.
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such as Direct Supply18 and Northwestern Mutual19 have partnered with
Milwaukee universities to establish talent pipelines in technology fields. But,
is there a legal design that could be implemented in Wisconsin to attract and
retain tech employers?
Once tech employers hire highly skilled employees, two important
considerations arise. First, how can the employee be retained to prevent the
employer’s investment in him or her to benefit a competitor? Second, how can
the employer’s proprietary information shared with the employee be protected?
Non-compete agreements, also known as restrictive covenants or covenants not
to compete, are often the solution.20 This Comment argues that to attract and
retain employers in the tech industry, which is vital for growth, Wisconsin
should adopt new statutory language21 and exercise judicial restraint that
reconciles interest conflicts between employers, employees, and the public.22
This Comment proceeds as follows. Part II examines non-compete
agreements generally and in Wisconsin, providing a fundamental
understanding of the current law and its function in practice.23 Part III delves
deeper into the use of non-compete agreements by tech employers.24 This Part
will also analyze California’s and Massachusetts’ approaches to non-compete

18. Kathleen Gallagher, Direct Supply Opens Technology Center at MSOE, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (Sept. 4, 2012), http://archive.jsonline.com/business/direct-supplty-opens-technologycenter-at-msoe-mv6o6ba-168516006.html/ [https://perma.cc/WJ68-74WG]. In 2012, Direct Supply,
Inc., a provider of equipment and information systems to the senior living industry, opened a
technology center on the campus of the Milwaukee School of Engineering. Id. The center houses
dozens of engineers and students and was described as a “key resource” in the company’s attraction
and development of tech talent in Milwaukee, WI. Direct Supply Opens Technology Center at
Milwaukee School of Engineering, LEADING AGE (quoting Bill Avery, Executive Vice President and
Chief Information Officer of Direct Supply), https://www.leadingage.org/direct-supply-openstechnology-center-milwaukee-school-engineering [https://perma.cc/UM3T-PREN] (last visited Oct. 7,
2019).
19. Nick Williams, Northwestern Mutual, Marquette and UWM Partner on $40M Data Science
BUS.
J.
(June
20,
2018),
Institute,
MILWAUKEE
https://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2018/06/20/northwestern-mutual-marquette-anduwm-partner-on.html [https://perma.cc/HZ8A-GP5T]. Northwestern Mutual, a Milwaukee-based
insurance giant, agreed in 2018 to not only partner with and provide office space for students and
innovators of Marquette University and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, but also to invest
fifteen million dollars in data science education and research. Id. The universities will also each
contribute twelve million dollars in efforts to address Wisconsin’s tech needs. Id.
20. In a 2011 study, nearly half of survey respondents belonging to the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers said they had been asked to sign a non-compete agreement. Matt Marx, The
Firm Strikes Back: Non-compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM.
SOC. REV. 695, 702 (2011).
21. See infra Appendix A.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part II.
24. See infra Part III.
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agreements in relation to the states’ respective tech climates.25 Finally, Part IV
offers summary analysis and provides detailed recommendations based on the
findings of previous sections.26
II. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS
A. Generally
Non-compete agreements have existed in the common law tradition for
hundreds of years.27 The agreements typically have three provisions designed
to reduce economic harm to the employer:
(1) the “noncompetition” provision, which prevents an
employee from engaging in activities that may, or do, compete
with the employer (e.g., working for a competitor or opening a
competing business); (2) the “nonsolicitation” provision,
which looks to restrict the employee from soliciting the
company’s other employees or customers; and (3) the
“nondisclosure” or “confidentiality” provision, which seeks to
limit an employee’s unauthorized use of confidential,
proprietary, or trade secret information.28
As for the enforceability of these provisions, fundamentally courts have
balanced two interests throughout the agreement’s history: (1) the interest of
the business owner in protecting his or her information and customers from
immoral competitors and employees; and (2) the interest of the employee to
move freely and follow his or her own interests.29 How courts balanced these
25. See infra Section III.B.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1960).
At the beginning of the nineteenth century when guild associations dominated economies, most highly
skilled jobs were artisanal in nature and apprentices were expected to eventually become masters
relying on the knowledge they acquired. Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets,
Restrictive Covenants in Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 441, 450 (2001). This master-apprentice relationship inherently protected trade secrets
as apprentices pledged to keep techniques secret in return for instruction. Id. at 451. Thus, noncompete agreements were not a factor in most of the highly skilled employment market. See id. As
the nineteenth century went on, the industrial economy replaced the craft economy, gradually changing
the rules surrounding the dissemination of knowledge. Id. The norms of guilds persisted, however, as
these rules developed. Id. at 454–55. For example, given the importance of practicing a trade to an
artisan’s livelihood, the early laws reacted with hostility to non-compete agreements. Id. at 455.
However, the potency of these norms declined with time, and by the turn of the twentieth century, noncompete agreements were relatively common as courts recognized and defined employer property
interests. Id. at 493.
28. Robert J. Orelup & Christopher S. Drewry, Judicial Review and Reformation of Noncompete
Agreements, CONSTR. LAW., Summer 2009, at 29, 29.
29. Blake, supra note 27, at 627.
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interests over time ebbed and flowed with the period’s social values and
business norms, but eventually resulted in a reasonableness standard.30
Sometimes referred to as the “rule of reason” test, modern courts generally
consider the employer’s interests and the impact of their enforcement on the
employee’s interests and the public’s welfare when determining whether the
scope of the non-compete agreement is reasonable.31 Additionally, factors such
as duration, geographic scope, and scope of the employee’s limitations may be
considered to determine reasonableness.32
When a non-compete agreement is found to be unreasonable, state courts
vary in their response.33 Some states modify the agreements, rewriting sections
of employment contracts if necessary, while others will only strike
unreasonable provisions and enforce the rest—the so-called “blue-pencil
doctrine.”34 Still others follow a strict no-modification approach or, in the case
of two states, presumptively void non-compete agreements all together.35
B. In Wisconsin
The primary source of non-compete authority in Wisconsin is section
103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes.36 According to this statute:
A covenant by an assistant, servant or agent not to compete
with his or her employer or principal during the term of the
employment or agency, or after the termination of that
employment or agency, within a specified territory and during
a specified time is lawful and enforceable only if the
restrictions imposed are reasonably necessary for the
protection of the employer or principal. Any covenant,
described in this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is
illegal, void and unenforceable even as to any part of the
covenant or performance that would be a reasonable restraint.37

30. Id. at 626–27.
31. J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara & Evan Starr, Understanding Noncompetition Agreements:
The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 369, 379 (2016).
32. Orelup & Drewry, supra note 28, at 29–30.
33. Id. at 30–44.
34. Id. at 30–31.
35. Id. at 31–32. The two states that do not permit non-compete agreements are California and
North Dakota. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2019).
36. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2015–2016). The statute was enacted in 1957 in response to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision in Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, where the court upheld part
of what the legislature deemed to be an overly broad non-compete agreement. Heyde Companies, Inc.
v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 131, ¶ 11, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 654 N.W.2d 830.
37. WIS. STAT. § 103.465.
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The statute indicates that Wisconsin is among the states previously
described that follows a strict no-modification approach, meaning if any part of
a non-compete agreement is determined to be unreasonable, the entire
agreement is void.38
Wisconsin case law has provided additional clarity on, and standards for,
the statute’s application. In Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, the court determined
that the Wisconsin statute reflects a strong public policy against the
enforcement of unreasonable trade restraints on employees.39 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court further established that courts will only enforce non-compete
agreements if they (1) are necessary to protect the employer; (2) provide a
reasonable time limit; (3) provide a reasonable territorial limit; (4) are not harsh
or oppressive to the employee; and (5) are not contrary to public policy.40
Subsequent cases broke these five Lakeside elements down and further
framed reasonableness in the context of non-competes. As for the first element,
the court in Lakeside said: “An employer is not entitled to be protected against
legitimate and ordinary competition of the type that a stranger could give.
There must be some additional special facts and circumstances which render
the restrictive covenant reasonably necessary for the protection of the
employer’s business.”41 In Wausau Medical Center, S.C. v. Asplund, the court
held that non-compete agreements are more likely to be necessary for the
employer’s protection if following factors exist: the business is based on
customer contacts; the employee has access to confidential information; the
employee’s reputation was established through work with the former employer;
and the employee obtained unique skills through the work with the former
employer.42
With respect to time limits, the second Lakeside element, reasonableness
depends on the period required to “obliterate” the customer’s identification of
the employee with the employer.43 Many cases have indicated that two years
or less is reasonable.44 Moving to the third element, courts have confined
territorial limits by considering the area of the employer’s business, especially
with respect to where the employee works, the nature of the employer’s
products, and any other factors the court deems relevant.45
38. See id.
39. 8 Wis. 2d 157, 162, 98 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (1959).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 163.
42. 182 Wis. 2d 274, 287–90, 514 N.W.2d 34, 40–41 (Ct. App. 1994).
43. Lakeside, 8 Wis. 2d at 164–65.
44. See Chuck Wagon Catering, Inc. v. Raduege, 88 Wis. 2d 740, 754, 277 N.W.2d 787, 793
(1979); Fields Found., Ltd. v. Christensen, 103 Wis. 2d 465, 479, 309 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Ct. App.
1981).
45. Lakeside, 8 Wis. 2d at 165–66.
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To determine if a non-compete is harsh or oppressive on an employee, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v.
Hamilton evaluated the extent to which a non-compete inhibited the employee’s
ability to “pursue a livelihood in that enterprise, as well as the particular skills,
abilities, and experience of the employee sought to be restrained.”46 The court
here continued by emphasizing the factors it listed could not be exhaustive, and
the reasonableness of the fourth Lakeside element must be considered with the
totality of the circumstances in mind.47 Finally, as to the last Lakeside element,
public policy can generally be expressed by statute, administrative regulation,
or by courts through the establishment of common law.48 Public policy with
respect to non-compete agreements in Wisconsin is framed primarily by
common law, with courts considering whether enforcing the agreement would
stifle competition and create a shortage of employees based on previous
decisions.49
In addition to the Wisconsin statutory requirements and the case law
thereunder, the state’s Supreme Court applies the following canons of
constructing to non-compete agreements: “(1) [non-compete agreements] are
prima facie suspect; (2) they must withstand close scrutiny to pass legal muster
as being reasonable; (3) they will not be construed to extend beyond their proper
import or further than the language of the contract absolutely requires; and (4)
they are to be construed in favor of the employee.”50
While non-compete agreements typically have three provisions,51 section
103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes appears to have been drafted with only the
noncompetition provision in mind.52 With respect to the non-solicitation and
confidentiality provisions, Wisconsin law presents a confusing picture.53
Non-solicitation provisions within non-compete agreements are still
governed by section 103.465, which requires an express territorial limitation
for the agreement to be reasonable.54 In operation, however, customer

46. 101 Wis. 2d 460, 470, 304 N.W.2d 752, 757 (1981).
47. Id.
48. Heyde Companies, Inc. v. Dove Healthcare, LLC, 2002 WI 131, ¶ 10, 258 Wis. 2d 28, 654
N.W.2d 830.
49. Lakeside, 8 Wis. 2d at 166–67.
50. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, ¶ 9, 243 Wis. 2d 305,
627 N.W.2d 444.
51. Non-compete agreements typically have noncompetition, non-solicitation, and
confidentiality provisions. Orelup & Drewry, supra note 28, at 29.
52. James W. McNeilly, Jr. & Darla A Krzoska, Protecting Business Interests with Covenants
Not to Compete, WIS. LAW., May 2006, at 12, 60.
53. Id.
54. Bradden C. Backer & John J. Kalter, Wisconsin Courts Struggle with Geography in
Nonsolicitation Agreements, WIS. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 10, 10, 60 n.2.
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limitations only implicitly set territorial limitations.55 “The customers subject
to a [non-solicitation provision] conduct business with the employer within a
defined, albeit changing, territory. The absence of an explicit territorial
limitation, accordingly, does not leave the [non-solicitation provision] with an
unlimited geographic scope.”56 Following its decision in Chuck Wagon
Catering Inc. v. Raduege,57 where the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted
customer limitations as reasonable, the court entertained arguments in Farm
Credit Services of North Central Wisconsin, ACA v. Wysocki and Equity
Enterprises Inc. v. Milosch that challenged the territorial scope of customer
limitations in non-solicitation clauses, and made conflicting decisions.58 The
decisions in these cases have created confusion among practitioners as to
whether territorial limitations are needed separately from express customer
limitations.59
Confidentiality provisions under Wisconsin non-compete law also create
confusion in practice. With the exception of agreements also protecting
intellectual property,60 agreements protecting information that qualifies as a
trade secret61 and information that does not so qualify, are also subject to section

55. Id. at 12.
56. Id. at 12–13.
57. 88 Wis. 2d 740, 277 N.W. 2d 787 (1979). In this case, the court upheld a non-solicitation
provision that prohibited an employee from soliciting customers along the same delivery route of his
employer, though there was no territorial limitation per se. Id. at, 745–47, 757. The court stated, “[i]n
Wisconsin a [non-compete agreement] is considered reasonable as to territory if, like this [agreement],
it is limited to the route or customers defendant actually services.” Id. at 754.
58. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, ¶ 1, 243 Wis. 2d 305,
627 N.W.2d 444 (finding that a non-solicitation provision that prohibited an employee from
performing services for customers the employee serviced for a set period was not invalid on its face
because the covenant was narrowly tailored to a customer list). Equity Enters. Inc. v. Milosch, 2001
WI App 186, ¶ 15, 247 Wis. 2d 172, 633 N.W.2d 662 (ruling against a non-solicitation provision that
prohibited the employee from doing business with any customer of the employer for a period by
faulting the provision’s lack of territorial limit).
59. McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 58.
60. See IDX Sys. Corp. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 285 F.3d 581, 585 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The parties have
not cited, and we have not found, any Wisconsin statute or decision subjecting non-disclosure
agreements between suppliers and users of intellectual property to the rules that govern noncompetition clauses between employers and employees. To the contrary, . . . [s]ection 134.90(6)(b)1
implies that contracts about intellectual property are valid, even when they exceed the domain of trade
secrets.”).
61. According to Wisconsin’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a trade secret means “information,
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique or process to which all
of the following apply: (1) The information derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; (2) The information is the subject
of efforts to maintain its secrecy that are reasonable under the circumstances.” WIS. STAT. § 134.90(c)
(2017–2018).

KRAUSE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE)

246

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/3/2019 7:52 PM

[103:237

103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes and the five-part Lakeside test.62 Under
Wisconsin’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, however, trade secrets are protected
without respect to time or territorial limits.63 Yet, under section 103.465, if
trade secrets and information that does not qualify as a trade secret are protected
under a single clause without time and territorial limits, the agreement is
unreasonable and, therefore, void in its entirety.64 Information that does not
qualify as a trade secret65 is not always easy to distinguish from information
that does and can present a threat to the employer from anywhere in the world
for an extended period of time.66 Therefore, in the interest of the employer,
non-trade secret information should never be disclosed, yet non-compete
agreements without a time limit are per se unreasonable.67 The confusion, then,
rests in making agreements that fully protect the employer’s proprietary
information from competitors, but also complies with section 103.465 of the
Wisconsin Statutes.68
Some may argue that confidentiality provisions in non-compete agreements
should simply be supplemented with non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), but
in practice, this solution provides less protection for an employer.69 While
NDAs are common, their compliance is far more difficult to track than noncompetes, as it is easier to determine whether a former employee is working for
another company than to establish that an employee is sharing confidential
information.70 Furthermore, Wisconsin has not ruled on whether the inevitable

62. McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 57.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. This can include any information under the wide umbrella of confidential information that is
not considered a trade secret under section 134.90 of the Wisconsin Statutes. See § 134.90. The
process of determining whether information is a trade secret under section 134.90 of the Wisconsin
Statutes is a fact-intensive process that relies on several factors: (1) extent to which the information is
known externally; (2) extent to which the information is known internally; (3) measures taken to guard
secrecy; (4) the value of the information to the business and its competitors; (5) amount of money and
effort spent developing the information; and (6) the ease or difficulty the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated. Genzyme Corp. v. Bishop, 463 F. Supp. 2d 946, 949 (W.D. Wis. 2006). Given
these many factors, a business may have difficulty determining what information may not be a trade
secret and, therefore, purposely or mistakenly make non-compete agreements protecting both trade
secret and non-trade secret information with the same language.
66. McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 57–58.
67. Ralph Anzivino, Drafting Restrictive Covenants in Employment Contracts, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 499, 529 (2010).
68. See McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 57–58.
69. See Matt Marx & Lee Fleming, Non-compete Agreements: Barriers to Entry . . . and Exit?,
12 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON 39, 42 (2012).
70. Id.

KRAUSE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

12/3/2019 7:52 PM

WISCONSIN, THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY

247

disclosure doctrine, as detailed in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond,71 allows an
employer to prove trade secret misappropriation simply by demonstrating that
a former employee’s new employment will inevitably lead to disclosure.72 A
ruling in conjunction with PepsiCo would make the violation of NDAs easier
to prove. But since this ruling does not exist and violations of NDAs are harder
to track, non-compete agreements with confidentiality provisions satisfy the
information security needs of employers better than non-disclosure agreements.
To summarize the many intricacies of Wisconsin non-compete law,
Timothy Nettesheim and Larri Broomfield explain several paradigms in their
article “Restrictive Covenants and the Wisconsin Service Professional.”73
Their piece warns practitioners of making agreements broad, restricting
employees from larger than necessary territories, and forgetting to spell out
non-solicitation and confidentiality specifics.74 Overall, it is a cautionary tale,
reflecting the state of non-compete law in Wisconsin. In Part IV, this Comment
will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the state’s non-compete law
further. But, to understand how these laws must change to attract high-tech
employers, first the interests of these employers and the policies of other states
must be thoroughly examined.
III. HIGH-TECH EMPLOYERS AND NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS
“High technology,” or “high tech,” is defined as “scientific technology
involving the production or use of advanced or sophisticated devices.”75 These
employers have several attributes:
First, high tech [employers] are labor intensive rather than
capital intensive in their production processes; [s]econd, they
employ a higher percentage of technicians, engineers, and
scientists than other industries; they are science based and
consequently apply to the marketplace scientific advances in
the form of new products and production methods; and third,
research and development are critical to the continued success

71. 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret
misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely
on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”).
72. Clorox Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 954, 967 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
73. Timothy A. Nettesheim & Larri J. Broomfield, Restrictive Covenants and the Wisconsin
Service Professional, WIS. LAW., Feb. 1993, at 20, 21–23.
74. Id.
75. High
Technology,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/high%20technology [https://perma.cc/9BG4-CZYY] (last visited Oct. 9,
2019).
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of high-technology ventures.76
Employers of this nature are in many industries, such as retail,
transportation, national defense, and medicine.77 As discussed,78 certain
manufacturers also rise to this distinction. These manufacturers focus on
producing technology with technology, and rely on innovation to drive their
production of high-tech goods.79 Hubs of these rapidly growing entities have
sprouted up in places like Silicon Valley, Seattle, Boston, and Austin, just to
name a few.80 They have unique interests in an ever-advancing field, and the
states they call home have addressed these interests in different ways—at least
in the context of non-competes. This section will discuss high-tech employers
generally, as the employers on this spectrum have common interests and are
usually not distinguished in legal contexts.
A. Interests of High-Tech Employers
There are two principal interests of high-tech employers, like most
employers, when they learn an employee is departing: (1) limiting competition
and (2) protecting secrets.81 Limiting competition, the first of these interests,
means preventing former employees from creating more competition for the
employer by working for a competitor or starting their own ventures in the
industry.82 While anti-competitive practices that restrain trade have long been
outlawed under U.S. law,83 this primal business instinct nevertheless persists.
The high-tech industry is a significant source of today’s innovation,

76. WILLIAM W. FALK & THOMAS A. LYSON, HIGH TECH, LOW TECH, NO TECH: RECENT
INDUSTRIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL CHANGE IN THE SOUTH 47 (1988).
77. Id. at 45–47.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15.
79. What is High-Tech Manufacturing?, EAGLE TECH., https://eagletechnologies.com/what-ishigh-tech-manufacturing/ [https://perma.cc/9VZJ-785D] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). Examples of these
employers include, Samsung, Texas Instruments, and Intel. See Consumer Electronics, SAMSUNG,
https://www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/business-area/consumer-electronics/
[https://perma.cc/936T-TYP7] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019); Technology & Manufacturing, TEXAS
INSTRUMENTS,
http://www.ti.com/about-ti/company/technology-manufacturing.html
[https://perma.cc/D4X4-QTT7] (last visited Oct. 30, 2019); Company Overview, INTEL,
https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/company-overview/company-overview.html
[https://perma.cc/3KT5-XTYE] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019).
80. Karsten Strauss, America’s Biggest Tech Hubs, by the Jobs, FORBES (Jul. 26, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/karstenstrauss/2017/07/26/americas-biggest-tech-hubs-by-thejobs/#a0611192f150 [https://perma.cc/K5TP-KHJS].
81. Marx & Fleming, supra note 69, at 41–42.
82. Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract Terms, 70 OHIO
ST. L. J. 1127, 1149 (2009).
83. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (originating from the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890).
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necessitating large investments in research and development by its players.84
Investments are made not just in the processes and products, but also in the
employees who conceive and execute them.85 In addition to the expertise
gained from on-the-job experience, high-tech employees have been seen to
benefit from their employer’s provision of long-term mentorship, advanced
training, and rewards for intellectual curiosity.86 Employees in the high-tech
industry and the knowledge, or the coherent mix of obtained information and
experience, they have, therefore, are strategic assets exceptionally valuable to
a competitor.87
The second interest of high-tech employers, protecting secrets, follows
from the first. In the innovation driven industry, preserving trade secrets and
other proprietary information allows a high-tech employer to maintain their
market position and competitive advantage over peers who do not have the
information.88 Simply put, the more competitors who know the information,
the lower its value, with the value disappearing entirely when the information
no longer becomes a relative secret.89 Programs and devices as well as
manufacturing processes, methods, and techniques that derive value have the
potential to be trade secrets under Wisconsin law90 if high-tech manufacturers
take steps to treat them as so.91 Other confidential and proprietary information

84. Agnieszka Zakrzewska-Bielawska, High Technology Company – Concept, Nature,
Characteristics, in RECENT ADVANCES IN MANAGEMENT, MARKETING, FINANCES 93, 93 (2010).
85. Id. at 94.
86. See Andreas Rekdal, 4 Chicago Tech Companies Making Professional Development a
IN
CHICAGO
(June
8,
2017),
Priority,
BUILT
https://web.archive.org/web/20170623110214/https://www.builtinchicago.org/2017/06/07/chicagocompanies-support-professional-development [https://perma.cc/JL3G-SHYG].
87. Zakrzewska-Bielawska, supra note 84, at 95.
88. MAGDALENA KOLASA, TRADE SECRETS AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN
EQUILIBRIUM 8 (2018).
89. Id.
90. See WIS. STAT. § 134.90(c) (2017–2018); Daniel C. Norris, Manufacturing a Trade Secret,
TODAY
(2014),
https://industrytoday.com/article/manufacturing-a-trade-secret/
INDUS.
[https://perma.cc/RA28-MXSR] (compelling manufactures to critically examine their manufacturing
equipment, processes, or systems for enforceable trade secrets).
91. The Uniform Trade Secret Act requires information to be “subject of efforts to maintain its
secrecy” in order to qualify as a trade secret. WIS. STAT. § 134.90. When considering this element,
courts consider several factors, including: “(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of
[the] business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in [the] business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by [the business] to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value
of the information to [the business] and to [its] competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended
by [the business] in developing the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information
could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.” Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 147 Wis. 2d 842,
851, 434 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1989) (quoting Corroon & Black-Rutters & Roberts, Inc. v. Hosch, 109
Wis. 2d 290, 295, 325 N.W.2d 883, 886 (1982)).
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that does not meet the strict statutory guidelines may also be worthy of
protection.92
Non-compete agreements serve to promote both interests. First, they
restrict the practice of a particular trade in a certain geographic area for a given
time, which blocks competitors from accessing valuable employees.93
Competitors will be wary of attempting to hire employees who have preexisting non-competes, even if they believe the agreements are unenforceable,
because of the length of time the new employee will be unable to work and the
legal fees associated with a potential tortious interference suit.94 Furthermore,
non-solicitation and confidentiality provisions protect an employer’s
customers, trade secrets, and other proprietary information, supporting
employers’ second interest.95 The security of knowing their interests will be
satisfied when an employee signs a non-compete, allows high-tech employers
to confidently increase investment in their workforce.96
Non-compete agreements also have advantages beyond those that address
a high-tech employer’s interests when an employee moves. One of the most
significant of these advantages is that non-competes discourage employees
from leaving in the first place.97 Understandably, most employees cannot
afford to abstain from working in their desired trade for one to three years, as
many non-compete agreements require.98 Even if the employee believes that
the agreement is unenforceable, the cost of fighting his or her employer’s
breach of contract suit, would be a significant deterrent.99 However, it is
uncommon for employees to believe an agreement is unenforceable because the
regularity of non-competes causes many to assume their validity and forgo the
use of legal counsel when considering departure.100 By keeping their valuable
employees, high-tech employers benefit by avoiding costs associated with
turnover and recruitment.101 Given the plethora of interests non-competes can
address, state non-compete laws are particularly relevant to high-tech
employers.

92. See McNeilly & Krzoska, supra note 52, at 57.
93. Marx & Fleming, supra note 69, at 51.
94. Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Enforcement of Noncompetition Agreements: Protecting Public
Interests Through an Entrepreneurial Approach, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 483, 489 (2015).
95. Id. at 488.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 489.
98. Id.
99. Sullivan, supra note 82, at 1137. The author compares the litigation of unenforceable noncompete agreements to a game of chicken. Id. at 1137–38.
100. Id. at 1136.
101. Marx & Fleming, supra note 69, at 51.
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B. State Non-Compete Law and High-Tech Employers
As discussed, courts and legislatures have balanced the interests of
employers and employees, as well as society, when determining the power of
non-compete agreements in their states.102 While the acceptable degree is
subject to debate, most can agree that employers should have the right to protect
themselves from unfair competition.103 Furthermore, some argue that enforcing
non-competes is essential to preserving one’s freedom to contract.104 This
being said, there are significant policy concerns surrounding the use of noncompete agreements. Namely, the hindrance of an employee’s right to move
freely in the market.105 Courts have promoted an employee’s right to choose a
livelihood utilizing his or her own knowledge and skills:
The average individual employee has little but his labor to sell
or to use to make a living. He is often in urgent need of selling
it and in no position to object to boilerplate [non-compete
agreements] placed before him to sign. To him, the right to
work and support his family is the most important right he
possesses.106
While a business may invest more in an employee who has signed a noncompete,107 if that employee leaves, he or she will be prevented from starting
new, potentially innovative ventures, which is a disservice to the public and the
economy.108
As is the case with many legal issues, a great deal of variation exists among
non-compete laws in states. California and North Dakota are the only two states
to ban them outright,109 while states like Texas and Florida have reputations for
placing few limits on the use of non-competes.110 For this Comment’s
102. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
103. Pivateau, supra note 94, at 490.
104. Id.
105. ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS,
RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 64 (2013). This stems, at least in part, from an historic antipathy for
contracting oneself into involuntary servitude. Abigail Shechtman Nicandri, Comment, The Growing
Disfavor of Non-Compete Agreements in the New Economy and Alternative Approaches for Protecting
Employers’ Proprietary Information and Trade Secrets, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1003, 1004 n.3 (2011).
106. Arthur Murray Dance Studios of Cleveland v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 704 (Ohio Ct. Com.
Pl. 1952).
107. See supra text accompanying note 95.
108. Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in an Array of Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES (June 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clausesincreasingly-pop-up-in-array-ofjobs.html?hpw&rref=business&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/9FFP-ZDN6].
109. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2019).
110. Greenhouse, supra note 108.
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purposes, the decisions of states regarding non-competes in relation to their
high-tech employer residents is of primary interest.
California and
Massachusetts are arguably the most relevant to compare.111 The states are each
home to established hubs of high-tech employers, respectively located in
Silicon Valley112 and Route 128,113 that benefit from the nearby talent pools of
San Francisco, Stanford, and Berkeley in California and Boston, Harvard, and
MIT in Massachusetts.114 The states also have very different non-compete laws,
with California banning the agreements115 and Massachusetts not.116
1. California
First, California. According to section 16600 of the California Business
and Professions Code, “every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void,”117 except with regard to the sale of a business.118 The ban is almost as
old as the state itself and has been repeatedly affirmed, with some courts even
going as far as to hold employers liable for punitive damages when they are
found using non-competes.119 When jurisdictional battles arise, and they often
do given the uncompromising rule, California outright refuses to recognize the
non-compete laws of other states and rejects choice of law clauses that attempt

111. Another state of interest is Hawaii, as it is the only state to explicitly direct its non-compete
law at high-tech employers. In 2015, a bill was signed into law barring non-compete agreements
“relating to an employee of a technology business.” 2015 Haw. Sess. Laws 516. The bill defines
“technology business” as one that “derives the majority of its gross income from sale or license of
products or services resulting from its software development or information technology development,
or both.” Id. The legislature found non-compete agreements to:
impede the development of technology businesses within the State by driving
skilled workers to other jurisdictions and by requiring local technology
businesses to solicit skilled workers from out of the State. Eliminating [noncompete agreements] for employees of technology businesses will stimulate
Hawaii’s economy by preserving and providing jobs for employees in this sector
and by providing opportunities for those technology employees to establish new
technology companies and new job opportunities in the State.
Id. at 514.
112. ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF A
HIGH-VELOCITY LABOR MARKET 3 (2003).
113. SUSAN ROSEGRANT & DAVID R. LAMPE, ROUTE 128: LESSONS FROM BOSTON’S HIGHTECH COMMUNITY 108 (1992).
114. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 67.
115. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019).
116. See 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 228. While there are limitations placed on non-compete
agreements, the states relatively new law does not ban the agreements outright. Id.
117. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2019).
118. Id. § 16601.
119. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 64–65.
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to move the contract out of the state’s reach.120 The law, and its enforcement,
reflects the state’s belief that employee mobility is paramount to its economy.121
One of the greatest drivers of this Golden State economy emerged on the
strip of land between San Jose and San Francisco now known as Silicon
Valley.122 There, in the 1940s and 1950s, dean of Stanford’s engineering school
Fredrick Terman encouraged his Stanford University counterparts to start
companies, resulting in the beginnings of giants like Hewlett-Packard and
Varian Associates.123 Over the next several decades, start-ups and established
technology firms, fueled by the students of nearby universities like Stanford
and the University of California, Berkeley,124 created a hub of innovation that
now employs over 1.6 million people and sees more than 19 billion dollars’
worth of venture capital investments within its borders.125 One group of
scholars describes the prevailing philosophy of Silicon Valley as promoting
“openness, learning, sharing of information, [and] the co-evolution of ideas.”126
While firms intensely compete, they also learn from each other in the
“collaborative” Valley with “porous” boundaries between employers.127 An
engineer in Silicon Valley summed up the local mentality by saying “there’s
far greater loyalty to one’s craft than to one’s company. A company is just a
vehicle that allows you to work.”128
Much can be attributed to Silicon Valley’s success, but some argue
California’s non-compete law is an essential piece.129 Given the restraints of
section 16600, employers in Silicon Valley learned early that they were unable
to contractually prevent their employees from leaving for a competitor or
starting solo ventures.130 This resulted in high velocity employment, or a “labor
120. Id. at 66. In addition to rejecting non-compete clauses, courts in California recently began
also rejecting non-solicitation clauses because they restrain trade. AMN Healthcare, Inc. v. Aya
Healthcare Servs., Inc., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2018).
121. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 64.
122. Francine Hardaway, From the Field: A Short History of Silicon Valley, in MEDIA
INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 367, 367 (Michelle Ferrier & Elizabeth Mays eds., 2017).
123. Id.
124. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 67.
VALLEY
INDICATORS,
125. Silicon
Valley
Data,
SILICON
https://siliconvalleyindicators.org/data/ [https://perma.cc/W9QC-DDLH] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
126. Chong-Moon Lee, William F. Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock, & Henry S. Rowen, The
Silicon Valley Habitat, in THE SILICON VALLEY EDGE: A HABITAT FOR INNOVATION AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1, 6 (Chong-Moon Lee, William F. Miller, Marguerite Gong Hancock, & Henry
S. Rowen eds., 2000).
127. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON
VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 2–3 (1994).
128. Id. at 36.
129. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 593 (1999).
130. Id. at 608.
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market in which job changes are frequent and employees do not expect to ever
make careers inside a single employer,”131 and an ensuing distribution of
employee knowledge.132 This reality, some argue, prompted the Valley’s
unorthodox culture of cooperative competition.133 Furthermore, they argue that
the spillovers of knowledge caused the hub to repeatedly reset its production
cycles, resulting in profound innovation.134
So, is refusing to enforce non-competes all there is to ending fiercely selfinterested and anti-competitive business behavior? Not quite. While yes, the
successes in California are significant, it is not all sunshine, rainbows, and
collaboration in Silicon Valley. In 2010, Adobe Systems, Apple, Google, Intel,
Intuit, and Disney’s Pixar were accused of uncompetitive hiring practices when
they agreed not to poach one another’s employees.135 The employers settled
the federal lawsuit quietly,136 but faced criticism when an order rejecting their
settlement in the class-action suit revealed “‘ample evidence’ that Silicon
Valley was engaged in ‘an overarching conspiracy’ against its own
employees.”137 Emails and affidavits unveiled a ring led by Apple Inc. founder
Steve Jobs that aggressively sought to limit the movement of employees and
had been doing so successfully for several years.138 A Google executive
testified that Steve Jobs threatened “war” if a single Apple employee was
hired.139 Over 64,000 technical employees who were affected by the hiring
practices were eligible for the class and to receive more than three billion
dollars collectively in damages.140 While the case is not a reflection of all
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

HYDE, supra note 112, at 3.
Gilson, supra note 129, at 608.
Id. at 608–09.
Id. at 609.
Ben Rooney, Six Tech Giants Settle DOJ Hiring Lawsuit, CNN MONEY (Sept. 24, 2010,
6:01
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2010/09/24/technology/DOJ_tech_firms_settle_hiring_charges/?iid=EL
[https://perma.cc/M6TR-65AR].
136. Id.
137. David Streitfeld, Court Rejects Deal on Hiring in Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/technology/settlement-rejected-in-silicon-valley-hiringcase.html [https://perma.cc/P3VQ-2PCL].
138. In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8,
2014) (order denying plaintiff’s motion for preliminary approval of settlements).
139. Id. at *7.
140. James O’Toole, Silicon Valley Firms Accused of Hiring Conspiracy, CNN BUSINESS (Apr.
21, 2014, 5:40 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2014/04/21/technology/enterprise/silicon-valleyhiring/index.html [https://perma.cc/P7X3-9WR4]. The August order rejected a settlement of 325
million dollars, but the case was dismissed in September of 2015 following a court accepted settlement.
In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., No. 11-CV-02509-LHK (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2015) (order
granting plaintiff’s motion for final approval of settlement). According to the settlement website, a
settlement of 415 million dollars was reached with Adobe, Apple, Google, and Intel in addition to the
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companies in Silicon Valley, it indicates that non-compete laws do not change
the interests of firms in limiting competition and protecting secrets.
2. Massachusetts
Moving on to Massachusetts. The governing law in Massachusetts is
chapter 228 of the 2018 Session Laws.141 However, because the law is
relatively new and only applies to non-compete agreements entered into on or
after October 1, 2018,142 it is not the best source to analyze in relation to
Massachusetts’s seven-decade old tech industry hub.143 Instead, the common
law traditions that governed Massachusetts’s non-competes pre-October 1,
2018 must be examined. Massachusetts courts began by upholding noncompete agreements on the grounds that contracts made freely should be
enforced.144 But later, and for much of its modern history, the state followed a
general rule that the agreement would be enforced if: “(1) it is necessary to
protect a legitimate business interest of the employer; (2) it is reasonably
limited in time and space; and (3) it is consonant with the public interest.”145
20-million-dollar settlement reached with the other defendants. HIGH-TECH EMPLOYEE ANTITRUST
SETTLEMENT, http://www.hightechemployeelawsuit.com/ [https://perma.cc/Z6XZ-3YBE] (last visited
Oct. 7, 2019).
141. 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 228. This bill was passed after years of debate and reflects a
compromise between “those who believe [non-competes] should be abolished because they are
fundamentally unfair to employees and bad for the Massachusetts economy, and those who believe
[non-competes] serve a legitimate business purpose when used in a reasonable manner.” Michael
Rosen, MA Legislature Passes Noncompete Reform Bill, MASS. NONCOMPETE LAW (Aug. 1, 2018),
http://www.massachusettsnoncompetelaw.com/2018/08/ma-legislature-passes-noncompete-reformbill/ [https://perma.cc/H8QB-9T5R]. Section 24L of the act requires non-compete agreements in the
state to meet eight requirements: (1) be in writing, signed, and expressly state the employee has a right
to counsel; (2) if entered into after being hired, provide “fair and reasonable consideration independent
from the continuation of employment”; (3) not be broader than necessary to protect an employer’s
trade secret, confidential information, and goodwill; (4) not last more than one year; (5) provide a
reasonable geographic area that does not exceed the area the employee had a material presence in
during the last two years of employment; (6) provide a reasonable scope that is limited to types of
services provided by the employee during the last two years of employment; (7) provide a “garden
leave” clause, which requires the employer to pay fifty-percent of the employee’s highest annualized
base salary for the restricted period; and (8) “be consonant with public policy.” 2018 Mass. Acts ch.
228 § 24L(b).
142. 2018 Mass. Acts ch. 228.
143. ALAN R. EARLS, ROUTE 128 AND THE BIRTH OF THE AGE OF HIGH TECH 7 (2002).
144. Laurence H. Reece, III, Employee Non-Competition Agreements and Related Restrictive
Covenants: A Review and Analysis of Massachusetts Law, 76 MASS. L. REV. 2, 4 (1991); e.g., Becker
Coll. of Bus. Admin. & Secretarial Sci. v. Gross, 183 N.E. 765, 766 (Mass. 1933).
145. Reece, supra note 144, at 4; e.g., Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 358 N.E.2d 804,
807 (Mass. 1976) (“It is well settled in this Commonwealth that a [non-compete agreement] will be
enforced if it ‘is reasonably limited in time and space, and is consonant with the public interest.’”
(quoting Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin, 175 N.E.2d 374, 376 (Mass. 1961))); Marine
Contractors Co., Inc. v. Hurley, 310 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Mass. 1974) (“Employee [non-compete
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The state construes the agreements against the employer146 and scrutinizes them
carefully.147
Massachusetts courts also consider public policy factors when determining
whether to enforce non-compete agreements.148 In this exercise, courts
encountered a school of thought that argues high-velocity employment causes
an over-abundance of start-up companies, which then weakens the base of
knowledge and prevents industry innovation.149 Scholars Richard Florida and
Martin Kenney argue:
Hypermobility . . . creates the vexing condition of individual
benefits pitted against “social” costs—costs that are passed on
to other individuals, other firms, or the economy at large.
These costs can be separated into four related categories: (1)
the disruption of ongoing [research and development] efforts,
(2) a sacrifice of “institutional memory,” (3) loss of investment
and subsequent underinvestment in human resources, and (4)
extreme career compression leading to high rates of worker
burnout.150
While this theory alone has not been entirely persuasive in Massachusetts,
trial courts pre-chapter 228 generally upheld or modified non-compete
agreements, consequentially restricting employee movement.151 Furthermore,
cost prohibitions limited the number of cases that were brought to appellate
courts, and those that did often went unreported.152
One area greatly affected by these pre-chapter 228 non-compete decisions
was Route 128. This fifty-five mile stretch of highway connecting the Boston
suburbs from north to south, began as “the Road to Nowhere,” but by the late
agreements] generally are enforceable only to the extent that they are necessary to protect the legitimate
business interests of the employer.”); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Danahy, 488 N.E.2d 22, 29
(Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (“[A]ny [non-compete agreement] is to be enforced only to the extent that it is
reasonable in time and space, necessary to protect legitimate interests, and not an obstruction of the
public interest.”).
146. Sentry Insurance v. Firnstein, 442 N.E.2d 46, 47 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (holding that noncompete agreements are construed against employers because they are often the result of unequal
bargaining power and employees rarely understand their implications).
147. Alexander, 488 N.E.2d at 28 (“Postemployment restraints . . . must be scrutinized carefully
to see that they go no further than necessary to protect an employer’s legitimate interests, such as trade
secrets or confidential customer information.”).
148. Kroeger v. Stop & Shop Cos., Inc., 432 N.E.2d 566, 568 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (“Among
the questions which courts typically ask are: . . . Is the restraint injurious to the public?”).
149. See, e.g., RICHARD FLORIDA & MARTIN KENNEY, THE BREAKTHROUGH ILLUSION:
CORPORATE AMERICA’S FAILURE TO MOVE FROM INNOVATION TO MASS PRODUCTION 87, 91 (1990).
150. Id. at 91–92.
151. Christine M. O’Malley, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech Industry:
Assessing the Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215, 1225 (1999).
152. Id. at 1225–26.
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1950s, it was deemed the “Golden Semicircle.”153 The highway earned this
name after attracting some of the first modern, suburban industrial parks to its
perimeter.154 Fueled by Cold War defense spending and the talented minds of
Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), these
industrial districts began attracting high-tech employers in the 1950s, including
Raytheon.155 Over the course of the next three decades, established companies
as well as startups benefiting from venture capital were producing great
innovations, especially in the manufacturing of transistors, semiconductors, and
minicomputers.156 By the 1970s, Route 128 had earned the distinction of being
the nation’s leading center of electronics innovation.157
Massachusetts pre-chapter 228 non-compete law fostered an employment
pattern in Route 128 that was very different from Silicon Valley’s collaborative
and integrated approach.158 Given the relative strength of non-compete
agreements, employees in Route 128 were motivated to stay with their
employer as opposed to joining another or starting their own venture.159 This
reality encouraged “long-term career patterns, vertical integration, and,
ultimately, internal rather than districtwide innovation,”160 as well as a “certain
conservative spirit.”161 It also resulted in secrecy “between companies and their
customers, suppliers, and competitors, reinforcing a regional culture that
encourages stability and self-reliance.”162 Many of the initial occupiers of
Route 128 were research labs funded by defense initiatives and propelled by
the knowledge of Harvard and MIT graduates.163 Interestingly, as nonprofits,
theses employers were unlikely to have noncompete agreements, resulting in

153. EARLS, supra note 143, at 9–10, 29.
154. Id. at 7.
155. Id. at 7–8. “Raytheon Company is a technology and innovation leader specializing in
defense, civil government and cybersecurity solutions.”
Who We Are, RAYTHEON,
https://www.raytheon.com/ourcompany [https://perma.cc/5H4W-E8YK] (last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
The company “provides state-of-the-art electronics, mission systems integration and other capabilities
in the areas of sensing; effects; and command, control, communications and intelligence systems.”
What We Do, RAYTHEON, https://www.raytheon.com/au/capabilities [https://perma.cc/L897-S2XZ]
(last visited Oct. 9, 2019).
156. EARLS, supra note 143, at 8.
157. SAXENIAN, supra note 127, at 17.
158. Gilson, supra note 129, at 606.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. LOBEL, supra note 105, at 68.
162. AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley Versus Route 128: A Look at How Companies are
Shaped by the Business and Social Cultures Around Them, INC. (Feb. 1, 1994),
https://www.inc.com/magazine/19940201/2758.html [https://perma.cc/J56C-4WP2].
163. Gilson, supra note 129, at 606.
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many of their employees leaving to start businesses in Route 128.164 So, despite
the region’s early development by uninhibited employees, the employees of
these initial employees, the so-called second stage, were constrained by noncompetes.165
The 1980s marked a peak in Route 128 high-tech production, as the 1990s
saw new tech hubs across the United States emerge and certain product markets
become all but eradicated by superior inventions.166 The economic and industry
downturns resulted in an exodus of some of the region’s tech talent, especially
to Silicon Valley.167 Some scholars attribute the decline and loss of talent of
Route 128 to the state’s non-compete law.168 They argue that the relative ease
with which employers in Route 128 were able to retain their employees limited
the sharing of knowledge in the region.169 When new technologies emerged,
employers that made heavy investments in dedicated equipment and specialized
labor were quickly overwhelmed and unable to adapt.170 Furthermore, the
isolation of individual employers prevented the collective technological
learning necessary in the always-innovating industry.171 Those who argue
Massachusetts’s pre-chapter 228 non-compete law hurt the state’s tech-hub
specifically cite the region’s failure to recognize the decline of
minicomputers172 and adapt by transitioning to smaller workstations and
personal computers, a move companies in Silicon Valley executed
effectively.173
However, some argue these examples are inappropriate and reject
comparisons between California and Massachusetts as indicative of
Massachusetts’s non-compete law being inferior.174 Christopher Geehern of

164. Id. at 606–07.
165. Id. at 607.
166. EARLS, supra note 143, at 8. The area’s defense contractors were also deeply affected by
the conclusion of the Vietnam War and the slowing of the space race. SAXENIAN, supra note 127, at
17. Raytheon alone laid off forty percent of its workforce. Id.
167. Id. at x.
168. See O’Malley, supra note 151, at 1229.
169. SAXENIAN, supra note 127, at 9.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The minicomputer was introduced in the 1960s as a smaller, cheaper, and more userfriendly alternative to the room-filling mainframes of the previous decade. Gordon Bell, Rise and Fall
of Minicomputers, ENG’G TECH. HISTORY WIKI, https://ethw.org/Rise_and_Fall_of_Minicomputers
[https://perma.cc/KYY6-NQMJ] (last visited Oct. 7, 2019). The system was equipped with a limited
number of programs to assist businesses with process control and data transmission. Id.
173. SAXENIAN, supra note 127, at 9.
174. See Greenhouse, supra note 108.

KRAUSE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

WISCONSIN, THE NEXT SILICON VALLEY

12/3/2019 7:52 PM

259

Associated Industries of Massachusetts175 asked “[i]f [non-competes] are so
onerous and burdensome, why aren’t we seeing a significant migration of talent
away from the companies that use [non-competes] toward the companies that
don’t use them?”176 He continued by pointing out that “[t]he companies that
use [non-competes] still attract plenty of the best and brightest.”177
Furthermore, “Michael Rodrigues, a Democratic state senator from Fall River,
[MA], said the government should not be interfering in contractual matters like
[non-competes]. ‘It should be up to the individual employer and the individual
potential employee among themselves,’ he said. ‘They’re both adults.’”178
Clearly, California and Massachusetts have very different non-compete
laws, and there are numerous views surrounding those law’s effects on each
state’s respective tech industries. Perhaps the story of William Shockley may
put these views in perspective. Shockley, a Nobel-prize winning physicist, left
a position on the East Coast for California in the 1950s and became the first to
produce silicon semiconductors—where Silicon Valley would eventually get
its name—in the region.179 While brilliant, Shockley lacked social and
management skills and, within a year of starting his California business, drove
away eight of his researchers.180 These researchers became known as the
“traitorous eight,” and two of them would go on to found one of the world’s
largest and most valuable high-tech manufacturers, Intel.181 It was from branch
offs like this that Silicon Valley rose to prominence.182 Had Shockley
established his business in Massachusetts, it is very likely the traitorous eight
would have signed a non-compete agreement and either been dissuaded from
being so “traitorous” or unable to start their own ventures nearly as quickly.183
While many policy considerations go into non-compete law,184 the story of
Shockley is telling of these laws in practice.

175. Management Team, ASSOCIATED INDUS. OF MASS., https://www.aimnet.org/aboutassociated-industries-massachusetts/management-team.cfm [https://perma.cc/F8SU-AT7Q] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019).
176. Greenhouse, supra note 108.
177. Id.
178. Id.
PRIZE,
179. William
B.
Shockley,
NOBEL
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/physics/1956/shockley/biographical/
[https://perma.cc/6HFYULL7] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
180. Alex Tabarrok, Non Compete Clauses Reduce Innovation, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (June
9, 2014, 10:23 AM), https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/06/non-competeclauses.html [https://perma.cc/YFR2-2TDJ].
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See supra Section III.B.

KRAUSE_FINAL_03DEC19 (DO NOT DELETE)

260

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

12/3/2019 7:52 PM

[103:237

IV. REFORMING WISCONSIN NON-COMPETE LAW TO ATTRACT HIGH-TECH
EMPLOYERS
A. Why Wisconsin Law Should Change
As discussed, section 103.465 provides statutory guidance for noncompetes in Wisconsin, which has been subsequently illuminated by common
law.185 Agreements that (1) are necessary to protect the employer, provide
reasonable (2) time and (3) territorial limits, (4) are not harsh or oppressive to
the employee, and (5) are not contrary to public policy, will generally be
enforced in Wisconsin.186 These agreements are prima facie suspect, closely
scrutinized, and construed in favor of the employee.187 These legal realities
have two implications: (1) Wisconsin non-compete law is more like
Massachusetts than it is like California,188 and (2) employers must consider
many factors to draft an enforceable non-compete agreement.189
While arguments to the contrary may exist from some in Massachusetts,190
an analysis of California and Massachusetts non-compete law demonstrates that
eliminating the use of non-competes creates high-velocity employment that
benefits high-tech employers because of the industry’s constant need to
innovate and adapt.191 With laws that complement the employee-restrictive
doctrines of Massachusetts and conflict with the free-market theories of
California, Wisconsin non-compete law does not currently offer a suitable
environment for immense growth of high-tech manufacturing.
The large and detailed body of Wisconsin non-compete common law has
prompted the creation of many advisory articles for attorneys in the state.192 As
a whole, the process requires precision and specificity,193 but even then, if any
185. See supra Section II.B.
186. Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 8 Wis. 2d 157, 161–62, 98 N.W.2d 415, 418-19 (1959).
187. Farm Credit Servs. of N. Cent. Wis., ACA v. Wysocki, 2001 WI 51, ¶ 9, 243 Wis. 2d 305,
627 N.W.2d 444.
188. Both Massachusetts and Wisconsin require that non-competes protect legitimate business
interests and have reasonable time and territorial restrictions. See supra text accompanying notes 40
and 144. The states also consider public policy, scrutinize the agreements carefully, and favor
employees. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 50, 145–46. Unlike California, Wisconsin does
not presumptively void non-compete agreements. See supra text accompanying notes 38 and 116.
189. Sara J. Ackerman, Restrictive Covenants in Employment: Drafting Enforceable
BAR
OF
WIS.:
ROTUNDA
REPORT
(Jan.
16,
2013),
Agreements,
STATE
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/RotundaReport/Pages/Article.aspx?ArticleID=10494
[https://perma.cc/NQ7B-BTUB].
190. See supra text accompanying notes 173–77.
191. See supra Section III.B.
192. See, e.g., Anzivino, supra note 67, at 499; Nettesheim & Broomfield, supra note 73, at 20;
Ackerman, supra note 189.
193. See Ackerman, supra note 189.
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provision or clause of the non-compete is deemed unreasonable, the entire
agreement is void.194 With regard to non-solicitation and confidentiality
clauses, serious confusion exists in practice, making the threat of a void
agreement even more significant.195 For example, it is unclear if nonsolicitation clauses can set territorial limits implicitly by setting customer
limits.196 Confidentiality agreements are difficult to navigate because the
protection of proprietary information is subject to time and territorial limits,
even though the information can do damage to an employer indefinitely and
from anywhere.197 Given these difficulties associated with drafting noncompete agreements, high-tech employers considering Wisconsin may lack the
confidence that their interests will be protected.198
Wisconsin non-compete law should change not only because of the flaws
in its current design, but also because of the state’s ripeness for tech growth.
CBRE, the largest commercial real estate services and investment firm of its
kind,199 ranked Madison, Wisconsin first on its list of tech talent momentum
markets in the company’s 2017 Scoring Tech Talent Report.200 The report
credited Madison’s labor pool growth,201 high number of millennial
residents,202 and well-educated populace203 for its tech success. With a
comparable university system and cost structure to Madison, Milwaukee’s techmarket has also shown promising signs.204 According to a report titled
“Milwaukee’s Tech Talent Impact,” Wisconsin’s largest city boasts “a sizeable
base of technology talent that consists of nearly 76,000 workers and supports
194. WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2015–2016).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 51–67.
196. See supra text accompanying note 58.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 60–67.
198. See supra Section III.A.
199. CBRE #1 Real Estate Company on Fortune’s Most Admired List, CBRE (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://www.cbre.com/about/media-center/fortune-most-admired-list-2019 [https://perma.cc/6BR9WKWQ].
200. Madison Named Top City for Tech Talent Growth, Ranking #1 on CBRE’s Annual List of
Tech Momentum Markets, CBRE (July 19, 2017), https://www.cbre.us/about/media-center/madisonnamed-top-city-for-tech-talent-growth-ranking-1-cbre-annual-list-tech-momentum-markets
[https://perma.cc/99NQ-24M7]. The report measured the change in tech job growth. Id.
201. “Over the past five years, the tech labor pool grew more than 50 percent in the Madison
area, with jobs in software development, computer systems support and technology engineering.” Id.
202. “The population of millennials in their 20s grew by 4,490 (7.3 percent) since 2010,
accounting for 29.6 percent of total growth in a population of 248,956.” Id.
203. “Madison ranks among the top 10 markets in the report for educational attainment - 44.7
percent of people 25 years old or older have a bachelor’s degree or higher.” Id.
204. Stephanie Morse, New Reports Cite Growth of Madison and Milwaukee as Tech
J.
SENTINEL
(July
27,
2018),
Employment
Clusters,
MILWAUKEE
https://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/2018/07/27/madison-and-milwaukee-makeprogress-tech-employment-clusters/836093002/ [https://perma.cc/TD4H-MPBH].
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more than 140 industries,” contributing more than twenty-seven billion dollars
to the regional economy.205 Top executives in Milwaukee predict 30,000 job
openings in the tech industry in the next five years.206 The current growth of
technology industries in Wisconsin combined with the state’s efforts to develop
a ready workforce,207 allow non-compete reform to further position Wisconsin
and its new Wisconn Valley on a national and international stage as a leader in
technology and innovation.
B. How Wisconsin Law Should Change
Reconciling long-standing conflicts between employer, employee, and
public interests, in addition to making the state hospitable for high-tech
employers, is no easy task. However, with a new, more specific statute and
restrained interpretation, all these interests may be to some degree advanced.
Based upon an analysis of high-tech employers and Wisconsin’s,
California’s, and Massachusetts’ non-compete laws, Wisconsin should adopt a
statute with the following language:
Agreements not to compete are lawful only between employers
and their employees who are privy to useful proprietary
information. Restrictions regarding scope, time, and territory
must be specified and reasonable in consonant with public
policy. Restrictions regarding information disclosure must be
specific as to the nature of the obligation and information
subject to it and must be reasonably necessary to protect the
employer. Any agreement, described in this section, imposing
an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void, and unenforceable
even as to any part of the agreement or performance that would
be a reasonable restraint.208
Useful proprietary information should be defined in the statute as
information whose value derives from its secrecy and could cause an employer
financial harm if disclosed. Courts should give deference to employers when
205. MILWAUKEE REGIONAL TECH HUB, MILWAUKEE’S TECH TALENT IMPACT: AN OVERVIEW
TECH
OCCUPATIONS
AND
TECH-DEPENDENT
INDUSTRIES
1
(2018),
https://www.multivu.com/players/English/8239954-northwestern-mutual-technology-jobsmilwaukee-economic-impact-study/docs/Fullreport_1530031313447-1486035915.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WXM3-L6VL]. The report is a “comprehensive study of technology talent and its
impact on the economy” and the result of a partnership of approximately twenty leading job creators
in the greater Milwaukee area. First-of-its-Kind Study Demonstrates Increasing Economic Impact of
(June
26,
2018),
Technology
Jobs
in
the
Milwaukee
Region,
MULTIVU
https://www.multivu.com/players/English/8239954-northwestern-mutual-technology-jobsmilwaukee-economic-impact-study/ [https://perma.cc/47QJ-B9ZX].
206. Morse, supra note 204.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 16–19.
208. See infra Appendix A.
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considering whether information fits this definition. The first sentence of this
statute and its corresponding deference and interpretation instructions serve two
purposes: (1) limit the number of employees subject to non-compete
agreements and (2) secure employer secrets. The first of these purposes
promotes employee and public interests, as it allows for more free movement
in the market than the current Wisconsin statute. The second serves employers,
but in a way that protects them from unfair competition rather than the mere
existence of competition. The suppression of employee movement by Steve
Jobs and other executives in Silicon Valley shows that even with a complete
ban, employers still find a way to promote their interests.209 Thus, a statute
such as this that allows employers to secure their interests while simultaneously
promoting employee movement is preferable.
The second sentence of the proposed statute210 is a nod to the current
reasonableness standard.211 It is subject to public policy, so courts can adapt
reasonableness standards as labor markets and public sentiments change in
ways we have yet to imagine. As discussed, throughout the history of noncompete agreements, courts have balanced employer, employee, and public
interests according to the time period’s norms,212 therefore, this statutory
provision deviates little from this area of law’s statutory interpretation process.
Unlike the sentence that precedes it, deference with regard to issues arising
from the application of this sentence should be given to the employee. This
deference instruction is another effort to encourage the free movement of
employees.
The third sentence213 attempts to resolve the current confusion with nonsolicitation and confidentiality clauses214 by separating the reasonable scope,
time, and geography standards from the protection of information. This
separation gives employers as much protection as possible, while also
preventing them from keeping employees out of the market and imposing
overly broad restrictions. Furthermore, it incorporates another Lakeside
element215 by necessitating that the protection of the information be necessary
to the employer.

209. See supra text accompanying notes 135–39.
210. See infra Appendix A (“Restrictions regarding scope, time, and territory must be specified
and reasonable in consonant with public policy.”).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 37–45.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 27–30.
213. See infra Appendix A (“Restrictions regarding information disclosure must be specific as
to the nature of the obligation and information subject to it and must be reasonably necessary to protect
the employer.”).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 51–67.
215. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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The final sentence of the proposed statute is essentially identical to the final
sentence of section 103.465.216 The sentence forces the court to find the entire
agreement unenforceable even if only one part is unreasonable. Allowing the
court to enforce certain portions of the agreement while striking others results
in a “blue pencil” rule.217 Wisconsin followed the blue pencil rule in Fullerton
Lumber Co. v. Torborg,218 but after the case, the legislature wanted a restraint
containing overly broad and invalid provisions to be struck down in its entirety
and adopted section 103.465 of the Wisconsin Statutes.219 Critics of the blue
pencil rule argue that allowing courts to modify agreements intrudes on matters
that should be negotiated between parties, turning judges into attorneys after
the fact and leaving parties with an agreement neither consented to.220 Given
the strength of blue pencil criticisms and Wisconsin’s very clear desire to rid
the state of the doctrine, this proposed statute does not alter the state’s response
to unenforceable non-compete provisions, even though invalidating only what
is unreasonable would make employers feel more secure.
A tech hub is not just a collection of employers; it is also a collection of
employees, supported by the public. A state can get as many tech employers to
set up shop as it wants, but it will be completely devoid of the benefits if
employees have no interest in the state’s legal climate. This statute recognizes
the interdependence of employers, employees, and the public and succeeds in
advancing each one’s general interests.

216. Compare infra Appendix A (“Any agreement, described in this section, imposing an
unreasonable restraint is illegal, void, and unenforceable even as to any part of the agreement or
performance that would be a reasonable restraint.”), with WIS. STAT. § 103.465 (2015–2016) (“Any
covenant, described in this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void and
unenforceable even as to any part of the covenant or performance that would be a reasonable
restraint.”).
217. William T. Rosenbaum, Note, Ohio Puts Away Its Blue Pencil, 5 CAP. U. L. REV. 99, 100
(1976).
218. 270 Wis. 133, 144, 147–48, 70 N.W.2d 585, 586, 592 (1955) (concluding that a ten-year
restrictive covenant was unreasonable, but by editing the contract, it deemed the covenant enforceable
for three years).
219. Streiff v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 602, 608, 348 N.W.2d 505, 509 (1984)
(“In 1957 after the . . . Fullerton Lumber case, the legislature adopted [section] 103.465 at the
suggestion of a legislator who was critical of the Fullerton Lumber decision.”). The court confirmed
its abandonment of the blue pencil doctrine in Star Direct, Inc. v. Dal Pra. 2009 WI 76, ¶ 76, 319 Wis.
2d 274, 767 N.W.2d 898 (“Though the question was withheld in Streiff, we now make clear that we
believe the legislative history and text of the statute do not eliminate or modify the common law rules
on divisibility. The statute’s prescriptions support this as they apply to any ‘covenant,’ not to the whole
employment contract. It specifies that if a restraint is unreasonable, the rest of that covenant is also
unenforceable.”).
220. See, e.g., Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for
Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 674 (2007).
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V. CONCLUSION
As the push for high-tech manufacturing jobs continues, states with
attractive legal climates will accrue great benefits. Wisconsin has already
attracted one tech giant in Foxconn but can do more to foster an environment
suitable for the high-tech industry by reforming its non-compete law. The hightech world is one of constant innovation, necessitating the relatively free flow
of innovators. Fortunately, it is possible through new and specific statutory
language, as well as judicial restraint in the application of this language, for
high-tech employees to move relatively freely while still protecting employers
from the loss of their valuable confidential information. By reconciling the
interests of employers, employees, and the public with non-compete law
reform, Wisconsin may just turn the Wisconn Valley into the next Silicon
Valley.
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APPENDIX A: PROPOSED WISCONSIN STATUTE
Agreements not to compete are lawful only between employers and their
employees who are privy to useful proprietary information. Restrictions
regarding scope, time, and territory must be specified and reasonable in
consonant with public policy. Restrictions regarding information disclosure
must be specific as to the nature of the obligation and information subject to it
and must be reasonably necessary to protect the employer. Any agreement,
described in this section, imposing an unreasonable restraint is illegal, void, and
unenforceable even as to any part of the agreement or performance that would
be a reasonable restraint.

